The Platonic myth in Book X of The Republic tells us how the choice of “destinies” is carried out by human souls about to be born. The revenant Er, in his particular nekia, returns to life to tell all he has seen and heard: that what life bring us is related to the good or bad choice of our future life trough a draw carried out under the eyes of Necessity and her three daughters: Lachesis, Clotho and Atropo, who weave (...) the destiny of men (The Republic, Book X, 617e): Theintelligible character of this choice has the burden of a determinism ab origine without possibility of rewriting it, making our fate an inalterable journey. Kant could say the same in KrV, although it is true that the doctrine of the “intelligible character” only appears specifically in 1781, in the light of the Third Antinomies, in the“Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason. Anyway, its long shadow appears in other texts (as in Religion Within Limits of Reason Alone of 1793)– that each one of voluntary acts of men: “it is predetermined, well before it occurs, in the empirical character of man” (KrV, A 553 / B 581) would suppose that this intelligiblecharacter would have to be understood together with the problem of freedom and decision. That threshold pointed out by Kant will be trespassed by Schelling, who will form a concept of freedom of a metaphysical character (libertas ex) which will send us to an origin, beyond all times, in which the de-cision, as ex-cision, restructures and sets in order our time. Cut or beginning, it is a wound without stitches which implies the proper opening of being into existence. (shrink)

A partir del conocido pasaje del Vom Ich de F.W.J. Schelling el texto propone una lectura del conocido como “resto irreductible” para dar cuenta del terror y de sus mecanismos de control. Se propone, en crítica a lo que Žižek hace con Hegel, una lectura lacaniana de Schelling que muestra, hasta qué punto, el “Hegel” presentado por Žižek no solo es un Hegel pasado por Lacan, sino también por Schelling.

It is untrue that, as Hegel said in 1807 in the Phänomenologie, «the wounds of the spirit heal and leave no scar behind; what is done is not indelible, but is reassumed by the spirit» (GW 9, 360) since the ground of reality, that reality which, as indicated by Kant, seems to be submerged in evil (Ak. VI), refuses to be tamed by concepts. Disappearance without remnant, that dissolution (Verschwindung) mentioned by Hegel would suppose that there is no remnant of (...) evil, thatits effects in history-such as the Jacobin terror with its macabre liturgy of severed heads referred to in the above passage of the Phänomenologieare nothing more than moments to be sublate (aufgehoben), part of a necessary process. There is no remnant to be explained. All is revealed: Offenbarung der Tiefe. The relationship between Hegel and Schelling has in this topic, the problem of evil and its meaning in history (Geschichte), one of its key points: in Schelling one can see a hollow which constitutes a pathway to the problem of finitude and evil, studied in depth in the Freiheitsschrift of 1809, partly as a response to the critics expressed by Hegel in the Phänomenologie. While Hegel reduced evil to an abstract negation, to be overcome through a determinated negation as a sign ofthe reason in history, in Schelling evil would remain a permanent possibility that can never be dissolved (verschwinden) or overcome (aufgehoben) any way. (shrink)